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after the war and to lead the other United Nations in building a 
new world order. 
CHINA'S NEW STRENGTH 
At Cairo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took part in a joint 
decision by the great powers on the treatment of a defeated Japan. 
This decision, to strip Japan of all territorial gains since 1895 
and to return to China her lost territories, means that the other 
powers expect China to replace Japan as the strongest Asiatic 
nation. Her partnership is recognized as essential in the execution 
of the military plans adopted at Cairo for the defeat of Japan. 
In the future, China will be counted on as one of the chief 
guardians of peace in the Pacific basin. 
To Americans this is a natural and welcome development, the 
logical climax, indeed, to a hundred years of American Far East-
ern policy. While China has achieved her new status by her own 
efiorts, Americans like to think that they have helped in the 
process. American teachers and technicians have aided China in 
building up her own strength, and the policy of the United States 
government has consistently been directed toward preserving 
and strengthening the territorial ir.tegdty and political indepen-
dence of China. 
The fact that China now takes her rightful place among the 
great nations of the world does not mean, however, that all her 
problems are solved. On the contrary, the greater the nation, the 
greater its problems and responsibilities. This has been recog-
nized by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in a message to the 
nation: 
By the abolition of the unequal treaties, our national respon-
sibilities have only been increased. We should meet the new 
responsibilities with a still keener resolve to do our duty. 
After the war China will face domestic problems of truly her-
culean proportions. The mere job of physical reconstruction in 
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war-torn areas is staggering. But China is not content merely to 
rebuild on the old basis. She intends to go forward, continuing 
the process of modernizing her 4,000-year-old civilization which 
was so rudely interrupted by Japanese attack. She intends to 
build up her industrial and military strength for purposes of 
self-defense and to fulfill her new role as a great power. Her 
ancient civilization, based on land and human labor, must be 
transformed into a new civilization based on the machine. In this 
process, social and political conflicts will inevitably arise. The 
Chinese revolution, begun in 1911 with the overthrow of the 
Manchu dynasty and carried a long step forward with the 
triumph of the Kuomintang in 1927, is yet far from completed. 
CHINA FIGHTS IN SPITE OF INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES 
Today, in her seventh year of war, and in spite of her new 
international recognition, China's internal position is perhaps 
more difficult than ever before in her modern history. Failure 
to appreciate this has led to confusion in the minds of many 
Americans. We have been fi lled with admiration at the way in 
which the people of China, in the face of almost incredible hard-
ships and disappointments, have stood up to the Japanese year 
after year without giving in. When Japan attacked in 1937, few 
people thought that China had a chance of successful resistance. 
Most observers expected her to yield without a serious struggle. 
When she did stand and fight, nea rly everyone predicted that she 
would be beaten within a month. But to the amazement and 
admiration of the world, China did not collapse. On the contrary, 
her people seemed to find in war greater strength and unity than 
they had ever found in peace. 
As months and years passed and China remained unconquered, 
people in the Western world endowed the Chinese with almost 
superhuman qualities. We began to talk of the "unbeatable 
Chinese" and to rank China as a great military power, only 
slightly below Britain and Russia. T he events following Pearl 
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Harbor seemed lO confirm this picture. The devastating defeats 
which we suaered at the hands of Japan taught us a new re-
spect for Japan's military machine. The fact that China had 
apparently stopped this machine while the Western powers were 
unable to do so increased our respect for China's prowess. So a 
sort of myth grew up of Chinese invincibility and indestructibil-
ity. China, we assured ourselves, could "take it" indefinitely. And 
since China is fighting on our side against totalitarian Japan, we 
naturally came to think of her as one of the great democracies-
the one country on which we could rely for democratic leadership 
in post-war Asia. 
WISHFUL THINKING VS. UNDERSTANDING CHINA 
Yet in this idealized picture of China there was much ignorance 
and wishful thinking. It did not correspond to the facts any more 
than our previous picture of China as weak, backward and supine. 
It is just as serious to overestimate China's capacity as to under-
estimate it. Nor does it help China if we expect her to do the 
impossible. For the miracle of Chinese resistance-and it is 
miraculous-has not been accomplished without a price. China 
has suffered tremendous losses in men and materials. Her people 
have undergone physical hardships almost inconceivable to us. 
Not least i~ the psychological strain of seven years of unremitting 
warfare, with the hope of large-scale aid from her allies still 
unfulfilled. China's development as a modern nation-so vigor-
ous and promising in 1937-has undergone severe setbacks, both 
economic and political. Social stresses and strains, accentuated 
by war-time uncertainty and dislocation, have shown themselves 
in dissension on the home front. 
If the facts about war-time China do not correspond with the 
rosy picture in the minds of many Americans, they are not wholly 
to blame. Because of censorship, the difficulties of war-time 
transport, and the temptation to idealize a gallant ally, compara-
tively little information is available to the public on recent de-
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velopments inside China. And much of what we do hear is con-
tradictory. 
On the one side, we hear that great progress has been made 
toward political unity and toward the economic development of 
the areas controlled by the Chungking government. We hear 
that the brutal Japanese attack has aroused Chinese of all walks 
of life to patriotic endeavor such as China has never seen before. 
The fighting qualities of the Chinese have been dramatized in 
the ahnost legendary exploits of her guerrilla warriors. And the 
recent fixing of a prospective date for ratification of the Draft 
Constitution seems to promise greater democracy than China has 
ever known. 
On the other side, we hear rumors of threatened civil war, of 
inOation and economic breakdown, of profiteering and chiseling 
-with which we are not unfamiliar in this country-and of mil-
itary incapacity. One of our leading military experts has described 
the Chinese troops as "poorly led and incapable of effectively 
utilizing modern arms." Other qualified observers have asserted 
that the domestic policies of the Chungking government are be-
coming increasingly reactionary, and that there is little likelihood 
of a genuine democracy being developed by the present leadership. 
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As is so often the case with conflicting reports, there is a great 
deal of truth in all of these stories. There is evidence of genuine 
and hopeful progress in China; there is also evjdence of de-
terioration and reaction. Many of the gains and losses seem to 
balance each other. But underneath these surface events, a pro-
found ferment is going on in China which may shape the future 
not only of China but of all Asia. Our war strategy and our post-
war policies will be affected by what happens in China. Hence it 
is important that we examine her problems realistically and 
sympathetically, in order to get as clear a picture as we can of 
the conflicting tendencies which exist today. For unless we under-
stand the possibilities of China, our plans for a secure peace in 
the Pacific are in jeopardy. 
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CHINA'S WAR-TIME ACHIEVEMENTS 
As a first step in this understanding, it might be well to gain 
an appreciation of China's truly remarkable military resistance. 
When the Japanese first invaded Manchuria and North China 
in 1931-32, the Chinese put up very little effective opposition. It 
is true that the 19th Route Army did put up a spectacular fight 
at Shanghai in the winter of 1932. But it received virtually no 
aid from the National Government troops under Chiang Kai-
shek. For a few weeks after Japan opened her attack in North 
China in 1937, it looked as jf history would repeat itself. Although 
some Chinese troops fought bravely at Tientsin and at Nankow 
Pass, north of Peiping, the Japanese encountered little difficulty 
in overrunning most of North China. It was not unLil fighting 
broke out at Shanghai some weeks later that it became certain 
that the main body of government troops in Central and South 
China would resist. But once the Shanghai battle got under 
way, it was clear that this time Chiang Kai-shek would fight-
that there would be no more efiorts at appeasement. 
For nearly a year and a half- that js, until the fall of Hankow 
in October 1938-there was severe fighting. Both Chinese and 
Japanese casualties were heavy. During this period the Chinese 
won at least one spectacular victory. This occurred at Taier-
chwang, Shantung, in April 1938, when the Chinese stlrrounded 
a large Japanese detachment, forcing it to retreat with heavy 
losses. Most of the Chinese triumphs, however, were defensive in 
nature. The Japanese ultimately seized whatever territory they 
wanted, but they often had to pay dearly for their conquests. 
With the fall of Hankow and Canton the Chinese freely 
~bandoned a fixed defense of cities and towns. Recognizing their 
mferiority in planes, tanks, guns and all other types of modern 
equipment, they began to fight a war of movement and attrition 
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rather than attempting the defense of strong points. Fighting 
became less heavy. Losses in killed and wounded were lighter. 
But resistance continued. And though the Japanese were usually 
able to march where they wished, they were frequently sur-
rounded and cut off and they suffered several serious setbacks. 
They were not able to destroy the Chinese armies. 
SERIOUS DEFICIENCY OF SUPPLIES, SUPPLY ROUTES 
From a military standpoint, the remarkable thing is that the 
Chinese were able to maintain resistance in the face of great in-
feriority of arms and supplies of all kinds. Comparatively little 
help has been obtained from abroad. After the loss of Canton in 
1938, there were only four routes by which supplies could reach 
China from friendly foreign countries: (1) a rail line through 
French Indo-China to Kunming; (2) the long overland route 
from Russia; (3) later, the newly constructed road over the 
mountains to Burma; and (4) smuggling through Hongkong. 
Following the fall of France in 1940, the Japanese induced the 
French to stop shipments through Indo-China. The Soviet Union 
continued to send assistance on a fairly large scale until it was 
attacked by Germany in 1941, but little has come in from Russia 
since that time. Japanese seizure of Hongkong on Christmas Day, 
1941, and the closing of the Burma Road in May 1942, cut the 
last overland routes to China, leaving the precarious air route 
over the eastern end of the Himalayas as the sole means of getting 
foreign supplies into the country.* 
As a result of being thus almost completely cut off from the 
outside world, the Chinese armies have had to fight with prac-
tically no air support, no heavy artillery, no armored equipment, 
and even without adequate transport equipment. Worst of all, in 
many respects, has been the shortage of drugs and medical sup-
plies. The wounded have not received adequate c2re, and hun-
dreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers have been rendered unfit 
• Until the opening of the Ledo Road in 1945.-Eo. 
10 
for duty by cholera, typhus, plague, malaria and tuberculosis. In 
the past few years the military losses from preventable sickness 
have been much greater than the losses incurred in battle. Yet 
despite these handicaps, Chinese resistance has gone on. No other 
country has ever fought so long with so little against such over-
whelming odds. 
This res.istance would have been impossible had the war not 
brought important gains on the industrial, governmental and 
political fronts. These gains were not as clear-cut as Chinese 
propagandists would have us believe. evertheless, they are sig-
nificant enough to deserve our attention. 
WAR-TIME ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
China's achievements on the economic front are particularly 
remarkable when it is remembered that the areas taken over by 
Japan contained nearly all of the country's pre-war industry, rail-
roads, navigable rivers, roads, and most of it; skilled workers. 
Moreover, such industry as China possessed before the war was 
chieAy devoted to the manufacture of light consumers' goods. She 
turned out a fair amount of textiles and cigarettes. But there was 
virtually no heavy industry. Nor were there factories capable of 
conversion to the production of tanks, guns or airplanes. Her 
military arsenals were equipped only for the production of small 
arms and ammunition, and most of these fell quickly into Jap-
anese hands. 
Some of China's achievements in developing industry in the 
areas remaining under Chungking's control are shrouded in 
military secrecy. But enough is known to give a general picture 
of the present situation. We know, for example, that a total of 
472 factories with machinery totaling 70,900 tons were removed 
from Shanghai, Hongkong and other war zones into the interior. 
T hese factories took w.ith them 12,160 of the original workmen. 
It is difficult to say just what proportion of China's pre-war in-
dustry was thus removed from the coastal areas. T hat it was a 
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fairly small proportion may be seen from the fact that there were 
only 170,000 cotton spindles operating in Free China in 1941 and 
245,000 in 1942 as against 3,000,000 in pre-war China. Most of the 
remainder were destroyed. Possibly .500,000 spindles escaped de-
struction and fell into Japanese hands. 
In other fields China's present production compares somewhat 
more favorably w.ith pre-war output. Coal production in Free 
China in 1942 is estimated at 6,000,000 tons as against 5,000,-
JOO in 1941. In the last pre-war year, 1936, coal output for the 
whole of China was 22,250,000 tons. Before the war there was 
comparatively little production of industrial alcohol, diesel oil 
or gasoline from native vegetable oils. In 1942 more than 9,000,000 
gallons of these liquid fuels were produced, which helped to re-
lieve the severe shortage of gasoline. Iron production, although 
extremely small by our standards, has increased fivefold since 
1940; steel output has risen by 50 per cent; machine-spun cotton 
yarn has jumped threefold; and the chemical industry has made 
substantial progress. The .interior province of Yunnan has a small 
but modern and efficiently run machine works which produces 
turbogenerator sets, boilers, gas engines, machine tools and tex-
tile machinery. 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES 
Whi1e most of the industrial development in Free China has 
been carried out either by privately-owned plants or by govern-
ment enterprises, a very considerable amount of production has 
been achieved in the most remote sections of the country by a 
unique movement known as the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. 
The cooperatives were organized in 1938 under the leadership of 
a Shanghai factory inspector, a New Zealander named Rewi 
Alley. They were peculiarly suited to the desperate conditions in 
China following the loss of. the last of the old industria l areas, 
those of Canton and Hankow. At that time Free China was al-
most wholly without capita l for industrial development. Large-
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scale industry was impractical because of the lack of machinery 
and the danger of Japanese bombing. But there was an abundant 
supply of labor, and small amounts of raw materials were avail-
able locally in many parts of China. 
Under the leadership of the industrial cooperative movement 
small groups of workers have been encouraged to set up small 
local industries. Very little capital is required since the tools and 
machines used are of the simplest type and most of the raw ma-
terials are obtained locally. The cooperatives are set up in caves, 
farmhouses and deserted temples. Although each unit is small, 
the total production is impressive. In the middle of 1942 the 
monthly production of 1,600 cooperative societies that had been 
set up was estimated at $24,000,000 in Chinese currency. Al-
together some 500 different items are manufactured by the coop-
eratives, including such things as woolen blankets, uniforms, 
shoes, raincoats, gunpowder, medical supplies, spinning wheels, 
looms, wrought iron, plows, printing presses, flour mills, foundry 
equipment, clothing, foodstuffs and household articles. Recently 
they have undertaken to produce articles for the United States 
Army as well as for the Chinese Army. The cooperatives also 
carry out an extensive educational program and have done much 
to raise the economic and cultural level of many remote villages 
in China's far interior. 
BIRTH OF POLITICAL UNITY 
During the first two or three years of the war, Chinese political 
unity was strengthened materially. The Japanese attack caused 
all political groups to subordinate their immediate interests and 
rally to the support of the National Government. Chiang Kai-
shek, as leader of the resistance, became the symbol of a united 
China. War lords who had fought against him for years pledged 
their support to his government. Many Chinese who had re-
garded Chiang as little more than a modern version of the old 
war lords similarly rallied behind him. A truce was reached in 
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the long struggle between Chiang and the Communists, with 
both agreeing to cooperate m the common war against Japan. 
Remote Sinkiang, formrrly known as Chinese Turkestan, has 
been brought under National Government control for the first 
time in many years. For a time even 'the tiny band of appeasers 
associated with Wang Ching-wei supported the National Gov-
ernment. So universal was the support for Chiang Kai-shek that 
Japan had great difficulty in finding any Chinese politician to 
head the puppet government which she had planned to set up. 
Finally Wang Ching-wei was persuaded to become the Chinese 
Quisling, but he was able to attract very little support. 
AGE-OLD DIVISIONS SUBORDINATED 
To us, such patriotic rallying to the national standard is no 
more than we should expect in a country which had been in-
vaded by as brutal an enemy as Japan. But it must be remembered 
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that China had never really been united since the days of the 
Manchu empire. Because family ties had always come first in 
Chinese thinking, only the educated and most advanced Chinese 
possessed national consciousness and deep patriotic feeling. The 
enemies of China had repeatedly taken advantage of China's 
sectional divisions to gain their ends. The Japanese, never very 
original in their tactics, had good reason to believe that they 
could gain support from Chiang Kai-shek's enemies by such 
time-honored methods as bribery and promises of power, which 
would make it unnecessary to crush him by military force. 
Moreover, the Japanese had a stronger political weapon than 
most of us realize in asserting that their chief goal was the de-
struction of the white man's power in the Orient. For nearly 
twenty years the Chinese had been carrying on a struggle against 
Western imperialism. But they had not fully succeeded in ridding 
themselves of the unequal treaties or other marks of white ascen-
dancy. In Manchuria, the Japanese had succeeded in freezing out 
British and American trade without being challenged. After the 
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attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese scored a series of decisive 
victories over the British, Americans and Dutch. These victories 
did not pass unnoticed in China. It cannot be denied that some 
Chinese were impressed when the Japanese argued that their 
main purpose was to rid Asia of white imperialism. While few 
prominent Chinese have actively cooperated with the Japanese, 
it is probably fair to say that a number of the Chinese leaders 
have always resented Western encroachments more than those 
of Japan. 
UNITY FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION 
Against this historical background, the degree of national 
unity that has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang 
Kai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable. Without it, the 
"miracle" of military resistance could not have taken place. The 
idea of a national struggle for national liberation has not only 
strengthened the morale of soldiers and civilians. It has also had 
a practical effect in bringing about cooperation between Chinese 
generals and local leaders, who in the past have tended to be 
very independent. It has made it possible to strengthen the power 
of the National Government in coordinating the nation's war 
effort. It has meant that a province such as Szechwan, which for 
years had been virtually independent of the National Govern-
ment, has put itself under Chiang Kai-shek's orders. It has meant 
that new roads could be built, airfields developed, and military 
measures taken without which continued resistance against Japan 
would be impossible. 
This process has not only aided the war effort, but has had 
more lasting effects as well. It has greatly strengthened the Na-
tional Government not only against Japan but also against the 
local provincial war lords. It has brought new funds into the 
national treasury. And it has contributed substantially to the eco-
nomic and social development of the interior provinces. In effect, 
it has brought some of them from the Middle Ages into the 
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twentieth century within a span of only a few years. Many parts 
of the country that were extremely backward before 1937-some 
without wheeled vehicles of any kind-now possess airfields and 
at least some modern industrial plants. And with modern ma-
chinery there have come modern ideas-ideas that have strength-
ened China in the face of the enemy. 
Among the ideas that have spread in China as a result of the 
war are those associated with democracy. In some respects China 
has always been a democratic country. Americans living .in China 
have always been impressed by the free and easy way in which 
Chinese of all classes and occupations laugh and talk with one 
another. Chinese coolies and peasants show little of the attitude 
of servility that is found in other Oriental countries. In theory 
and to some extent in practice, the son of the coolie or the farmer 
always could, if he possessed unusual ability, rise to become a 
scholar or government official. Since the overthrow of the 
Manchus, there has been no hereditary aristocracy. The old 
Chinese custom of having officials chosen by examination rather 
than through political influence was essentially democratic in 
operation. While it did not give the people the power to choose 
their ru lers, it did open the way, to some extent, for men of all 
ranks to rise to power. 
STEPS TOWARD DEMOCRACY 
The goal of Chinese progressives since the overthrow of the 
Manchus in 1911 has been the creation of a modern democratic 
state modeled after the United States and the French Republic. 
In its early days the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, strongly 
opposed the anti-democratic rule of Yuan Shih-kai and the war 
lords of the 1920's. But despite China's democratic habits, Sun 
Yat-sen and other revolutionary leaders recognized that the 
people as a whole were not ready for self-rule. Only a small frac-
tion of the adult population could read or write. There were no 
traditions of voting either by ballot, by town meeting or sov.iet, 
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or by any other clear-cut means of expressing the popular will. 
Recognizing this, Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, pro-
posed a period of tutelage during which the people . would be 
prepared gradually for self-rule. During this period of tutelage 
the full responsibilities of government were to rest in the hands 
of the Nationalist Par~y or Kuomintang. Although Sun Yat-sen 
seems to have thought of this period as being a relatively short 
one, it has been in effect since the establishment of the Nationalist 
Government in 1927. 
Just before the outbreak of war in 1937, a new constitution was 
prepared which was to serve as the basis for a constitutional, 
democratic government. The draft of the proposed new constitu-
tion was published on May 5, 1936, and plans were set up for 
summoning a People's Congress in November 1937 to ratify the 
constitution and set a date for putting it into effect. The war in-
tervened, however, and for several years the entire project was 
shelved. 
THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL 
Agitation for a more representative form of government was 
stimulated by the social and political awakening that accom-
panied the war. In response to this growing popular pressure, the 
Nationalist Government took its first step toward democracy 
when it set up, in 1938, a People's Political Council. The Council 
has only advisory powers. None of its 200 members is elected by 
popular vote, and half of those appointed are Kuomintang mem-
bers. Nevertheless, it has served a genuinely democratic function. 
By drawing jn individuals from difierent political groups and 
representatives from non-government agencies, the Council has 
aided to some extent in keeping the government aware of popular 
thinking. And its existence as a forum for the discussion of na-
tional policies has constituted a brake on dictatorial actions by 
the government. In some instances its proposals have been ac-
cepted by the government, and although its influence has been 
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necessari ly limited, it has been generally exerted in a progressive 
direction. 
The prospects for an early realization of Sun Yat-sen's dream of 
constitutional government in China were further advanced in 
September 1943, when the Central Executive Committee of the 
Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, voted to summon a People's 
Congress no later than one year after the war to ratify the Draft 
Constitution. Although this action merely provided for carrying 
out plans that had been made in 1936, it was nevertheless good 
news to the progressive groups in China, which had been urging 
more rapid progress in introducing democratic institutions. A few 
months earlier, reports from Chungking had indicated that the 
Kuomintang leaders had determined to postpone the establish-
ment of a constitutional government for some years after the 
close of hostilities. In announcing the new decisions, General-
issimo Chiang Kai-shek declared that after the constitution was 
adopted, the Kuomintang would take its place on an equal foot-
ing with such other political parties as might develop. He pledged 
that all parties would have equal treatment with respect to free-
dom of assembly, organization, speech and publication. 
CRITICISM OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION 
Many Chinese are not satisfied with the Draft Constitution, 
however, regarding it as unwieldy and undemocratic. For ex-
ample, it provides for a People's Congress of about 2,000 members 
which is to meet for one month every three years. Members of 
the People's Political Council have proposed that this be s11pple-
mented by a Political Assembly of some 200 members, meeting 
every six months, which could exert a more direct popular con-
trol over the executive branch of the government. 
Another war-time step toward democracy has been the promul-
gation of a system of self-government for the hsims or counties 
of China. A program was drawn up in August 1939 by a group 
of government experts called together by the Ministry of Interior. 
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Hsien assemblies have been set up in more than half of the hsiens 
in the country. These assemblies are composed of representatives 
indirectly elected by groups of ten, a hundred, or a thousand 
families in villages and towns, together with representation from 
professional organizations. The assemblies do not appoint the 
local magistrates, but they have general supervision of local 
budgetary matters. Even this modest start toward local self-gov-
ernment is important in a country like China where administra-
tive matters have always been decided from above. Critics assert, 
however, that this system of representation is unnatural and cum-
bersome and that in practice the so-called self-governing bodies 
have been dominated by the landlords and merchants. Real self-
government, even in the villages and country districts, is still 
far from being achieved. 
PUT YOURSELF IN CHINESE BOOTS 
When measured against the handicaps which she has had to 
overcome, China's war effort is truly impressive. Try to imagine 
that an enemy power has occupied both seacoasts of the United 
States and most of the country east of the Mississippi. The capital 
has been moved to Denver and is flooded with refugees. Then 
take away nearly all of the factories, railroads, highways, tele-
phone and telegraph lines, electrical equipment, coal, iron and 
oil fields from the unoccupied area. Even so, we should be better 
off than China for we should still have an abundance of skilled 
labor and trained technicians and administrators. For the political 
picture, go back to 1776 when our country consisted of thirteen 
"sovereign" states with hardly any organized national govern-
ment, and plenty of conservatives who saw no sense in fighting 
for that new and unfamiliar idea, the "United States of America." 
Keep up the enemy pressure for seven years with little help from 
outside. That might give you a rough idea, in American terms, 
of what China has been up against. 
If you can picture America in any such plight, you can imagine 
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also that the picture of conditions in "Free America" after seven 
years would not be bright. And there is, indeed, a darker side to 
the picture of war-time China. It is disturbing to friends of 
China, but it is not surprising, nor does it cause any real misgiv-
ings as to China's future among those who know her people and 
believe in their practical sense and their democratic spirit. 
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OBSTACLES TO CHINA'S WAR EFFORT 
We may as well recognize that China is not fighting a "total 
war," in the sense that Britain is, for example. For that matter, 
neither is the United States. Chinese as well as foreign critics 
have pointed out that her war effort still falls far short of the 
fullest possible mobilization of the country's human and material 
resources. There is plenty of inefficiency and "chiseling" .in war-
time China, and some graft. As in America, there are still indi-
viduals who put their own .interests above those of the nation. 
More disturbing is the evidence that China has actually lost 
ground since the beginning of the war on both the economic and 
the political fronts. While this is perhaps only to be expected after 
seven years of grinding effort, it raises serious probleMs affecting 
the future of China after the war. China is not as strong, either 
economically or politically, as she was in 1937. The drain on her 
resources has been too great. We must grasp this fact if we are 
to discharge our obligations as friends and allies of the Chinese 
people. 
INFLATION 
The heavy economic price which China has paid for her re-
sistance to Japan may be seen most clearly in the inflation which 
has the entire country in its grip. Prices have mounted to fantastic 
levels and are steadily rising at a rate of at least 10 per cent a 
month. By the beginning of 1944 the average citizen of Chung-
king was paying more than 200 times as much for food, clothing 
and other essentials as before the war. The price of some manu-
factured goods had increased 500-fold. Although the rise in prices 
started in the early days of the war, it was aggravated after the 
loss of Canton and the cutting of the Burma Road by the shortage 
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of all kinds of imported goods and supplies. When goods are 
short and hard to get, money, which can be printed anywhere, 
loses its value and prices are bound to skyrocket. 
At first the only persons to suffer seriously from the inflation 
were foreigners, teachers, government officials and Army officers 
-all of whom are dependent on fixed salaries. College professors 
were perhaps hit the hardest. Early in 1943 it was estimated that 
the salaries of full professors in the Chinese universities, despite 
some increase, had a purchasing power only about one-twentieth 
as great as their pre-war salaries. In contrast, coolies, skilled work-
ers and farmers sufiered little, if at all, during the first few years 
of inflation. Wages increased to keep pace with the rising cost of 
living, while farmers benefited from higher prices for their crops. 
By the end of 1942, however, all groups in the population were 
beginning to feel the pinch. The universal shortage of goods and 
the efforts of the government to control the rising prices had led 
to a growing economic paralysis. Except for a few kinds of skilled 
labor, wages had fallen behind the rise in living costs. Farmers 
were beginning to find that prices of the things that they needed, 
few as they were, had mounted more than the prices they received 
for their crops. Only the speculators profited, while many small 
farmers lost their lands. 
More serious from the standpoint of the war effort was the 
fact that industrial production and construction had begun to 
slow down. Manufacturers who had made contracts with the 
government found that owing to the constant increase in prices 
of raw materials and labor they could not afford to fulfill their 
contracts. They found it more profitable to hoard and speculate 
jn raw materials than to turn them into finished goods. As a re-
sult, nearly a fifth of the small factories in the Chungking area 
were not operating in the early months of 1944. Mineral output 
had also been cut drastically, and because of the extremely high 
costs of transportation, most construction, including the building 
of new industry, had come to a standstill. 
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POOR PLANNING 
Nor was inflation the only factor interfering with China's war 
production. Behind the inflation and partially responsible for it 
was poor planning by the government. The outstanding weakness 
in the Chinese war economy is to be found in its extreme depen-
dence on imports from abroad. This defect is recognized, al-
though not publicized, by most Chinese industrial and political 
leaders. As early as 1942, Chou Mou-pei, an important Chungking 
industrialist, predicted "the total collapse of the machine industry 
in the interior" because of a dependence on imported parts. He 
urged a change in basic policy which would make China more 
self-sufficient in raw materials and war supplies. 
An analysis of such production figures as are available shows 
that really very little has been done in more than six years of war 
ro build up the basic war industries. We find, for example, that 
the total steel production jn 1942 was only about 1 0,000 tons. Of 
course, it would be unfair to compare this with the 90,000,000 
tons turned out annually in the United States. Yet competent 
authorities believe that by making use of small village industries 
as well as what large-scale facilities there are, China could ir:.-
crease its iron and steel production several times. But without 
an over-all plan for war production, such an increase would be 
futile. Actually, according to one of China's leading newspapers, 
the Ta Kung Pao, "the iron and steel industry at present pro-
duces more than consumers can buy." Commenting further on 
the inadequacy of industrial pb.nning in war-time China, the 
Ta Kung Pao adds: 
A sound plan for industrial development has been lacking so 
far. Although government enterprises have achieved consider-
able results, it is open to discussion whether there is sufficient 
planning for the future. Private industries are being developed 
without rational planning in relation to existing communica-
tions and raw material supplies. 
24 
INTHANCI or A 1-. fODERN ('IfU"CK ING IIOSPITAl.. 1-fOMES, SCHOOLS AND Sill LTFRS 
HAVE ALSO Bl:.l.~ CONSTRUCT! D IN TilL PROTFCTING ROCK. 
ALLil:.D AIRr>.l t:. ~ , ''sOl\11 WII ERE IN CHINA, " 
25 
SPECULATION 
It has been charged that the economic policies of the govern-
ment have had the effect of encouraging people with money to 
use it in speculation and profiteering instead of investing it in 
war industry. Hence, it is said, China's resources are not being 
used as fully as they might be for war production. This charge is 
partly confirmed by no less a person than Chiang Kai-shek him-
self. Speaking before the Second Production Conference in 
Chungking in the summer of 1943, the Generalissimo urged that 
idle capital be used for production "instead of being allowed to 
circulate in other fields according to changing market conditions." 
The Ta Kung Pao echoed the same complaint when it declared 
that commercial speculation was "absorbing a large part of the 
available capital." lL then went on to make a statement which 
gives a key to the l'nderstanding of China's war-time economic 
difficulties. In the search for riches, it declares, Chinese "mer-
chants are ... becoming landlords, while the landlords are . 
becoming merchants, and neither of them wants to invest m 
industrial enterprises." 
To understand why this has happened, it is necessary to re-
member that China has lost her seaports, her industrial cities, and 
most of her contacts with the outside world. The new, modern 
China that was beginning to grow up before the war was based 
on the port cities. When Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow 
and Hongkong fell into the hands of the enemy, the bankers, 
merchants and industrialists who had founded modern business 
establishments in the cities either stayed behind and fell into 
the hands of the Japanese, were killed, or lost their property to 
the enemy. With this class of modern, forward-looking business 
men largely out of the picture, financial leadership in present-day 
China has passed into the hands of those whose wealth lay in the 
interior, chiefly large landowners and merchants. This group does 
not have the modern traditions of the port cities. It has its roots 
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in China's centuries-old system of land-ownership and is chiefly 
interested in perpetuating that system. 
FARM PROBLEMS 
As in all Oriental countries, Chinese society has from ancient 
times been based on the land and on a system of landownership 
which seems oppressive by modern standards. Comparatively little 
has been heard in this country regarding the problem of share-
cropping and farm tenancy in China. Some writers have even sug-
gested that it is not a serious problem. To support this statement 
they quote the estimate of a well-known American authority on 
China, Lossing Buck, to the efiect that the landlords control 
30 to 70 per cent of the land, a proportion that is not much higher 
than in many other countries. 
The truth is that the tenancy problem varies considerably in 
different parts of China. In some sections, chiefly North China, 
most of the land is owned by those who farm it. But in other 
areas, including a large part of what is now Free China, most of 
the land is controlled by absentee landlords. The rents charged 
in these areas are extremely high, amounting to half or more of 
the total crop. Moreover, the landlords, moneylenders and mer-
chants often work together to maintain this highly exploitative 
share-cropping system by making small loans at extremely high 
rates of interest and thus keeping the peasants constantly in debt. 
Naturally, this combination has great political as well as eco-
nomic power in the areas where it is dominant. 
INFLATION MULTIPLIES DIFFICULTIES 
Inflation and the accompanying wave of speculation have 
probably increased this power, since this group alone has had 
idle money to use for hoarding and speculation. And to complete 
the vicious circle, this increased power has been used, according 
to the Ta Kung Pao, to prevent the Chinese government from 
instituting the bold policies necessary to stimulate production and 
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bring inflation under control, thus obstructing the effective 
prosecution of the war. Some critics go even further and insist 
that the government's policy of subsidizing the landowners by 
agricultural credit loans-on the theory that this would increase 
farm production-has merely given the landlords more money 
for speculation and for lending out at exorbitant rates of interest. 
Although conditions in the two countries are far from parallel 
- for one thing, China's landlords are much more powerful than 
America's farmers-American war-time experience with the farm 
bloc may help us to understand how a politically powerful eco-
nomic group can influence government policy in its own interests. 
The greatest dissatisfaction with government policies has arisen, 
however, in connection with the war-time measure of colkcting 
taxes from the peasants and small craftsmen in goods, such as 
·rice, wheat or shoes, instead of money. This tax in kind is, of 
course, a natural outgrowth of inflation. Similar steps have often 
been used in other countries to combat hoarding. In a period 
when prices are rising rapidly, taxes payable in currency are 
unsatisfactory, particularly for a country at war. Vast quantities 
of grain, meat and other farm products are needed to feed the 
Army, and the government can be sure of getting these supplies 
only if it collects them directly from the producer. 
GRAFT, ABUSE OF LAWS CAUSE UNREST 
At best, such a tax was bound to be unpopular with the farmers. 
But resentment has been much greater in China because of 
the presence of widespread favoritism and graft. It is generally 
believed that the large landowners, having both influence and 
money, get off rather lightly in the forced grain collections, 
while the poorer farmers are forced to contribute up to half of 
their total crop in "taxes." Furthermore, much of the grain that 
is collected never reaches the government authorities but serves 
merely to enrich the local militarists. 
Equally unpopular with the Chinese peasant has been the en-
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forcement of the universal service law, which, in theory, is sup-
posed to mobilize Chinese manpower for an all-out war effort. 
In some areas half to two-thirds of the men of military age have 
been conscripted for the Army. A large proportion of the men 
thus taken from their homes are never heard from again. In addi--
tion, a proportion of the men, horses and carts in every villag~.. 
are drafted for local transport and other non-combatant service. 
The national service regulations are also subject to gross abuse. 
The peasants complain that they are often forced to work on 
projects wholly unconnected with the war for the benefit and 
enrichment of local military leaders. 
In several parts of the country the resentment against forced 
grain collections and national labor service has led to open re-
volts against the government. The most serious of these occurred 
in the widely separated provinces of Kweichow in the south and 
Kansu in the far west. But several smaller peasant uprisings 
are known to have taken place in other parts of Free China. 
The Kansu revolt, in which many Moslem Chinese took part, 
involved an area with a population of one to two million and was 
still not fully suppressed in the middle of 1943. Kweichow's 
uprising, which occurred earlier, was eventually put down. 
MILITARY WEAKNESS 
China's economic weakness is undoubtedly one of the main 
explanations for the fact that her huge armies have been un-
able to drive a much smaller number of Japanese into the sea. 
No one knows just how many men are under arms in China. But 
the total is known to be at least 3,000,000, while Japan probably 
does not have more than 600,000 soldiers in China. Some Amer-
ican military critics have expressed rather disparaging opinions 
of the quality of China's armies, calling them poorly organized 
and inefficient as a fighting force. They have even accused China 
of manufacturing "paper victories," that is, of claiming a great 
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victory in a communique when what actually took place was 
only a minor maneuver. 
We may discount many of these cnUcJsms as the opmwns 
of persons whose information about China is limited. Yet one 
of China's own generals was highly critical of China's military 
leadership after a Chinese setback in the spring of 1943. Review-
ing the campaign in a Chinese newspaper, General Ch'en Ch'eng 
wrote that the Japanese success was obtained because of "our 
negligence." He specifically criticized China's failure to co-
ordinate the military, political and economic aspects of the war. 
How are these harsh criticisms to be reconciled with the 
"miracle of Chinese resistance" of which we spoke earlier? Cer-
tain it is that the Chinese Army showed itself capable of stub-
born and heroic resistance in the early days of the war. More-
over, the Chinese have shown great originality and tenacity in 
guerrilla operations. 
The explanation of these seemingly conflicting views of China's 
military capacity is not as difficult as it seems. As individuals 
the Chinese make good soldiers. On that point there is general 
agreement. American military observers who have worked and 
fought with the Chinese maintain that the average soldier, if 
well armed, well trained and capably led, is fully equal to the 
Japanese. The weakness of the Chinese Army is due to lack of 
weapons and supplies-the reasons for which we have already 
examined-together with poor training and inferior leadership. 
TRADITIONS TO BE OVERCOME 
This latter statement should not be taken as a cntJctsm of 
Chiang Kai-shek, although the Generalissimo has long occupied 
the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armies. Actu-
ally, the difficulty lies in the fact that Chiang does not have full 
control over most of the huge army that is nominally under his 
command. In China, soldiers have always owed a personal al-
legiance to provincial or local military leaders, as in Europe dur-
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.ing the Middle Ages. This feeling is giving way to one of loyalty 
to the nation, but the old habits and loyalties are by no means 
dead. While an increasing number of these local leaders will 
take orders directly from Chiang Kai-shek, there are still im-
portant leaders who will not. And as there are great differences 
in the capacity and resources of the various leaders, there is bound 
to be a great difference in the training and equipment of the 
troops. 
On top of this is the unfortunate fact that China has never 
trained a sufficient number of officers for so large an army. The 
soldier has never held a high standing in Chinese society. For 
this reason, perhaps, Army officers have been poorly paid and 
few of China's better educated or progressively-minded young 
men have sought military training. While the famous Whampoa 
Military Academy has undoubtedly turned out some capable 
leaders, the number has been small in relation to China's 
needs. And even Whampoa graduates have not escaped the in-
fluences which made political wire-pulling more important than 
military capacity in carving out a successful military career. The 
fact that Whampoa men today hold must of the important posts 
in the Army may be due as much to clannishness as to superior 
ability or training. 
The lack of adequate military leadership may also be affected 
by Chinese traditions in still another way. The Chinese Army has 
virtually none of the democratic tradition that would enable men 
of superior ability to rise easily to positions of authority and lead-
ership. Consequently, its leaders are not the kind of men who 
are likely to demand military reforms. Nor do they think in 
terms of an all-out program involving an increase in the produc-
tion of war materials or the us~ of guerrilla tactics. On the con-
trary, they tend to cooperate with the reactionary landlord-
merchant groups in preventing the mobilization of the peasants 
and the placing of the country on a total war footing. 
When we examine both the economic and the military weak-
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nesses of present-day China, we find that a major obstacle to 
overcoming these weaknesses is political. Needed reforms are 
blocked by government officials whose thinking has not changed 
as fast the conditions around them. We must, therefore, examine 
the political situation in present-day China. 
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' POLITICAL DIVISIONS 
Many Americans assume that the only important division in 
Chinese politics is between the Right as represented by the Kuo-
mintang, or Nationalist Party, and the Left as represented by the 
Communists. This is far from true. All members of the Kuo-
mintang subscribe, in theory at least, to the doctrines of Sun 
Yat-sen, summed up in the Three People's Principles: (1) Na-
tionalism (freedom from foreign control), (2) Democracy and 
(3) Livelihood (freedom from want). But since it is in e!Iect the 
only legal party, the Kuomintang contains many diverse and 
often conflicting elements. The groups within it divide up more 
along lines of personal or sectional loyalty than on questions of 
principle. Nevertheless wide differences in ideas do exist. 
Political groups in China are not cle<}rly marked and are con-
stantly shifting. Hence any brief account, like the one below, 
is bound to be oversimplified and may not be up to date in detail. 
The important thing to remember is that many different shades 
of political opinion are represented in "Kuomintang" China and 
in the Kuomintang party itself. 
Of the many conflicting factions within the Kuomintang, four 
are of outstanding importance: (1) the business-banking group 
headed by H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance; (2) the "Political 
Science Group" containing both businessmen and landlords; 
(3) the political bloc known as the CC clique, led by two 
brothers, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu; and (4) the military 
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clique dominated by the "Whampoa Group" of officers, of which 
General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, is the leading figure. 
There are many smaller groups and a number of prominent per-
sonalities who do not belong to any group, such as T. V. Soong, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sun Fo, the son of Sun 
Yat-sen, founder of modern China. 
All four of the main factions hold important cabinet posts. 
Early in 1944 the CC group had the largest cabinet representa-
tion. It controlled the ministries of educat.ion, communication 
and social welfare, and had until recently controlled that of 
information.* 
BUSINESS-BANKING GROUP 
Dr. H. H. Kung, the Finance Minister, has been described as 
a sort of political tent under whirh officials of every shade of 
opinion find shelter. He may be said to represent the business-
banking group, which, before the war, was moderately pro-
gressive in outlook. It could be counted on to support most 
measures looking to the modernization and strengthening of 
China's economic structure. But, as we have seen, the loss of 
the port cities has brought the landlords and merchants of the 
interior into an increasingly dominant position. With the change 
Kung's policies have shifted. But despite the shift, his influence 
over China's economic and financial policies has been increasingly 
challenged by the faction known as the Cheng Hsueh Hsi, or 
*In November 1944 the Chinese cabinet was reorganized. Among the prin-
cipal changes were: 0. K. Yui succeeded H. H. Kung as Minister of Finance, 
but Mr. Kung remained as Vice-President of the Executive Yuan; General 
Ch'en Ch'eng succeeded General Ho Ying-chin as Minister of War, but 
General Ho remained as Chief of the General Staff; Chu Chia-hua succeeded 
Chen Li-fu as Minister of Education, but Chen Li-fu became Minister of 
Kuomintang Organization . Jn December T. V. Soong, while retaining his 
post of Foreign Minister, was made Acting President of the Executive Yuan 
(equivalent to Premier), a position formerly !Jeld by Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek.-Eo. 
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"Political Science Group," headed by General Chang Chun and 
Governor Wu Ding-chang. 
POLITICAL SCIENCE GROUP 
As its name suggests, the Political Science Group was ongi-
ally organized by Western-educated Chinese who favored a 
modernization of China's economic and political structure. Its 
emphasis, however, has been upon decentralization. It wants more 
freedom for private enterprise in the provinces and provincial 
control over monopolies rather than control by the National Gov-
ernment. It advocates government subsidies to private interests 
rather than all-out government ownership or control. Because 
of this emphasis, the group has found its support chiefly among 
leaders in the provinces. H. H. Kung dominates the National 
Government's financial system, while the Political Science Group 
has controlled economic policy in the provinces. There has been 
a constant, sharp struggle for power between the two. Each has 
the backing of an important section· of the banking and indus-
trial interests. Because of its ties with the provincial landlord-
merchant class and the militaristic local governments, the Po-
litical Science Group tends to throw its influence in favor of 
conservative policies. 
THE CC GROUP 
The C.C. P'ai is a Chinese version of an American political 
machine. It has, indeed been called China's Tammany Hall. It 
owes its immense political influence to the fact that its men hold 
most of the strategic positions in China's one legal party-the 
Kuomintang. One of the two Chen brothers who head up the 
CC group, Chen Li-fu, is the Minister of Education, a post which 
gives him control over the indoctrination of students and the 
intellectual life of the nation. The other, Chen Kuo-fu, is head 
of the Personnel Division of Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, 
where he controls the distribution of government jobs and is in 
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charge of the appointment of local hsien, or county, magistrates. 
Another CC leader, Hsu En-tseng is Vice-Minister of Communi-
cations and head of the powerful Investigation Bureau, while 
another, Ku Cheng-kang, is Minister of Social Affairs. Through 
this latter post, the CC group not only has control over labor and 
the rural cooperatives but has full powers over all organizations 
in Chungking and vicinity. 
To buttress this political power the CC group several years 
ago set up its own secret police patterned closely on the Nazi 
Gestapo. This police has directed its activities chiefly against 
students, university professors and other intellectuals suspected of 
either democratic or Communist leanings. Since both students and 
professors have been hard hit by the inflation and are dependent 
on a government rice allowance for existence, the supervisory ac-
tivities of the CC secret police have been highly effective in con-
trolling the expression of opinion. 
Because the CC group has been highly critical of British and 
American policies since Pearl Harbor and is strongly anti-Soviet, 
its inOuence has caused many misgivings among United Nations 
leaders. The C.C. P'ai has often been accused by democratic 
groups within China of Fascist, and even pro-Japanese, sym-
pathies. Charges of this kind cannot easily be proved or dis-
proved. But the CC group has invited them by adopting many of 
the trimmings of Nazism and Fascism in its methods of party 
organization. Its secret police, for example, and its methods for 
the control of labor and the cooperatives, were consciously pat-
terned after German and Italian models. In domestic policy, the 
CC group has consistently fought all efforts to make the Kuomin-
tang more democratic, and has taken the lead in urging the 
suppression of the Communists. 
TH E ARMY 
Since the revolution of 1911 China has been dominated largely 
by military leaders. The rise of the Kuomintang in 1927-2R 
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brought an end to the rule of the old-type war lords. But the 
Army leaders associated with the Kuomintang still have power 
and influence far beyond that wielded by n'lilitary men in most 
Western countries. Chief among these, of course, is Chiang Kai-
shek himself. But there are many others whose names are not 
well known abroad. Many are governors of provinces; others 
hold important posts in the Chungking government. The Army 
has been dominated in recent years by the graduates of the 
Whampoa Military Academy, of which Chiang Kai-shek is hon-
orary President. This group is known as the Whampoa P'ai. 
THREE IMPORT ANT GENERALS 
Probably the most influential Army man in China is General 
Ho Ying-chin, M.inister of War. He is best characterized as an 
Army politician. Although General Ho is not a member of the 
Whampoa Group, one of its leaders, Ku Chu-tung, is considered 
to be a "Ho" man. The Chinese Minister of War nominally has 
little real power, but General Ho exerts great jnfluence by bal-
ancing rival Army cliques against one another. He has retained 
his influence despite the fact that he often has been accused of 
being pro-Japanese, anti-British and anti-democratic. 
Although Ho is a rival of the CC group in the struggle for 
power within the government, his policies have not been basically 
very different from those of the CC. He has never got along any 
too well with British, American or Soviet military men. And he 
has made no secret of his opposition to the Chinese Communists. 
He opposed Chiang Kai-shek's decision to form a united front 
· with the Communists before the outbreak of war, and he is be-
lieved to have been chiefly responsible for the attack on the Com-
munist New Fourth Army a few years ago. Although his action 
in dispatching troops against the kidnappers of Chiang Kai-shek 
in 1936 is said by some people to have endangered Chiang's life, 
the Generalissimo has never disciplined him or openly opposed 
him in any way. 
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Probably the ablest fie ld commander in the Chinese army is 
General Ch'en Ch'eng, who in 1943 commanded the Chinese 
forces on the Salween River front in Yunnan. Modern in his 
methods and ways of thinking, General Ch'en has scored several 
notable successes against the Japanese. Important also is the fact 
that he gets along well with the Brjtish and Americans and 
understands their ways of working. Yet at the same time Ch'en 
Ch'eng enjoys great prestige in China. He has held a number 
of government posts, including that of governor of Hupei prov-
ince, and works closely with Chiang Kai-shek. 
Another important Whampoa leader is General Hu Tsung-nan, 
commander of Chiang Kai-shek's famous First Army. General 
Hu is aggressive and ambitious. He commands some 500,000 of 
the best troops in China. either he nor his troops have been in 
action against the Japanese. They are stationed in the northwest, 
supposedly as a strategic reserve to be used in an emergency. 
The fact that this huge army has been maintained in the area 
adjacent to the Communist districts, cutting the Chinese Red 
Army ofi from other parts of Free China or from possible con-
tact with the Soviet Union, has caused many observers to charge 
that Hu is there to "watch" the Communists. General Hu has, 
however, borrowed some of the Communists' methods, and has 
encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives in his 
area. In many respects he must be reckoned among China's more 
energetic and capable leaders. He is known as a Chiang Kai-shek 
man and, like Ch'en Ch'eng, is independent of the more re-
actionary groups wi~hin the Army. 
SECRET POLICE 
There are many other military leaders with influence on the 
Chinese political scene, but we shall not complicate the picture 
with a longer list. Mention must be made, however, of Tai Li, 
whose name inspires fear in Chjna. He is the head of the secret 
police operating under the direction of the Military Afiairs Com-
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mittee. T his is another Gestapo-like organization, which has 
little connection with the CC political police, mentioned above; 
it is in some ways a rival body. Although active primarily in mili-
tary zones, it is sometimes in conflict with the CC police. T here 
are also the hsien ping, or gendarmes, who nominally have the 
responsib.ility for policing communications in the war zones. 
Originally set up as a kind of M.P. to help maintain army dis-
cipline, the hsien ping frequently make unauthorized arrests. 
Indirectly connected with the Army is the San Min Chu I 
Youth Corps, named after the San Min Chu I or Three People's 
Principles of Sun Yat-sen. This organization has as its purpose 
the training of young men and women in the teachings of Sun 
Yat-sen so that they may become politically informed members 
of the Kuomintang. Although bearing some resemblance to the 
Hitler Youth, it is not really a "youth" corps but is made up in 
large part of older men. It has attracted, however, a good number 
of students and other young people. Since membership in the 
Corps is an aid in obtaining a rice subsidy, its ranks have grown 
rapidly since the war and it now constitutes an important political 
force. Although violently anti-Communist, it is independent of 
the CC clique. According to some observers, the Youth Corps 
has become more progressive in the past few years, but this judg-
ment is disputed by others. 
T.V. SOONG 
One of the few Chinese leaders who is well known abroad is 
T.V. Soong, now Foreign Minister. He has played a prominent 
part in government affairs since the beginning of the Kuomin-
tang Revolution in 1926. But although able, honest and experi-
enced in financial matters, "T.V." has never enjoyed a large fo l-
lowing in China. Like his sister, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, he is 
regarded as too Western in thought and habits to gain great in-
fluence. He is the center of a small group made up largely of men 
who have studied in the United States or England, and contain-
41 
ing professors, bankers, engineers and other intellectuals who 
have faith in the system of Western capitalism as applied to 
China. H e was head of the Bank of China until February 1944, 
when he was replaced by H. H . Kung. H is friends believe that 
he will yet rise to a position of leadership in China, and he is well 
regarded by the British and Ameri~an officials with whom he has 
worked in the past few years . 
It would, of course, be a mistake to overemphasize the political 
divjsions within the Kuomintang. Most of them are of long 
standing, and they are probably no more serious today than be-
fore the war. Lacking legal opposition parties, the Chinese have 
given a place in the government to leaders of all the factions 
through an elaborate system of compromises. This has meant a 
sacrifice of unity, but it has provided fairly wide representation 
for the various military and civilian cljques in high governmental 
posts. It is only when we recognize the peculiar make-up of 
the government that we can understand the position of Chiang 
Kai-shek. 
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S LEADERSHIP ESSENTIAL 
The fact that Chiang js President of the Republic, Prime Min-
ister and Commander-in-Chief of the Army has led many people 
to think of him as a dictator. This is hardly accurate. Although 
on paper his powers are great, actually he serves as a sort of 
balance-wheel, stabi lizing the conflicting forces of the various 
groups. Changes in policy usually result, not from any initiative 
on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, but from a realignment of the 
pressures operating on him. Even Chiang's enemies pay tribute 
to the skill with which he has maintained the stability of the 
National Government during the past fifteen years . It is doubtful 
whether any other Chinese leader could have held the govern-
ment together during this critical period . Chiang's real authority 
derives from his own outstanding qualities of leadership and 
from the enormous prestige which he enjoys among all factions 
in China and among the people at large. 
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The weaknesses in the present set-up arjse largely from fac-
tors beyond the immediate control of the Generalissimo. It so 
happens that the progressive forces in China are mostly outside 
the government, and to a large extent outside of the K uomintang. 
Hence there is little effective pressure for constructive changes. 
' Individually, many of the more prominent government officials 
and employees would probably welcome a more progressive pro-
gram. But despite their posts they have little real political power, 
less today than when the government was located at Nanking. 
The real economic and political power is exercised behind the 
scenes by the merchants and landlords of the interior. A revitaliza-
tion of the government in the interest of a more effective prose-
cution of the war could be achieved only by the emergence of new 
political forces capable of challenging the power of the landlord-
merchant coalition. 
THE COMMUNISTS 
For the past fifteen years the Communist Party has provided 
the chief opposition to the Kuomintang or government party. 
During the revolution of 1925-1927, when the Kuomintang came 
into power, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party 
worked jn close alliance. Then a split occurred and under Chiang 
Kai-shek's leadership the Kuomintang turned against the Com-
munists. The latter set up a soviet regime in Kiangsi province 
but after many campaigns they were ousted from this region 
by government troops and made the.ir famous "Long March" to 
Shensi in the northwest. Campaigns against them continued. 
Finally, in December 1936, occurred the dramatic kidnapping of 
Chiang Kai-shek by the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, 
who was sympathetic wjth the then widespread demand for a 
united front against the growing menace of Japan. A united 
front agreement was in fact concluded in 1937, shortly before 
the Japanese attack. The government agreed to stop fighting the 
Communists and the Communists agreed to place themselves 
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CHILDREN OF GUERRILLA FIGHTERS. 
under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and to modify thejr more 
radical social policies. 
As China is not like any other country, so Chinese Commu-
nism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in jt resemblances 
to Communist movements in other countries and you can also 
find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist movements that 
have figured in American history. Because there is no other 
effective opposition party in China, the Communists have at-
tracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese 
who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care 
less. Raymond Gram Swing described. Chinese Communists as 
"agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices." 
AGRARIAN AND POLITICAL POLICIES 
In the past the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and 
ruthlessly with landlords and others whom they considered op-
pressors of the people, and expropriated landlord estates in order 
to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today, in the in-
terests of the united front, the Communists have largely aban-
doned these extreme methods. Their present program is reform-
ist rather than revolutionary. They no longer expropriate the 
property of landlords, except that of traitors; in fact they welcome 
the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help fight 
Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes and exorbitant interest 
rates, and encouraged education, cooperatives and other measures 
of popular improvement. In addition, they have developed a 
rough and ready system of local democracy in the villages under 
their control. Elected councils have been set up in village, town 
and distrjct, and the local executive officials are also chosen by 
popular vote. Tax assessment committees, made up of local 
farmers, have been set up to assure fair administration of taxa-
tion. These measures, reflecting the most deep-seated desires of 
the Chinese peasant, have given him the feeling of having a stake 
jn the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the peasants for 
support of the war effort. 
Apart from a small area around northern Shensi, near the 
"Red capital" at Yen an, the region under Communist control is 
located behind the Japanese lines. Huge sections of the northern 
provinces have been retaken from the Japanese by guerrilla fight-
ers organized and led by the Communists. Estimates of the num-
ber of people living in these areas run as high as fifty million. 
American observers who have visited these regions report that 
the people and the resources of these regions have been organ-
ized for defense on a more effective basis than in Kuomintang 
China. The keystone of this defense is guerrjlla organizations of 
the local peasants, although they work in close relationship with 
the troops of the Chinese Red Army. 
Although the Red Army, usually referred to nowadays as the 
Eighth Route (or 18th Group) Army and the New Fourth Army, 
is nominally under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, this ar-
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rangement has remained largely theoretical. According to the 
agreement entered into between the Communists and the Na-
tional Government in 1937, the Red armies were to receive about 
$700,000 in Chinese currency monthly to meet their payrolls, and 
they were also to be armed and equipped like any other branch 
of the Chinese Army. Actually, the Communist troops say they 
have received no pay from the Nat.ional Government since De-
cember 1940, and no ammunition has been sent them since 
October 1939. Even medical supplies have been held up, although 
three truckloads sent from America in 1942 eventually reached 
them. Contrary to many people's impression, no munitions have 
ever been shipped from the Soviet Unjon to the Chinese Red 
armies. Had the Soviets desired to send such supplies, they prob-
ably would have been unable to do so because the Communist 
areas have been blockaded by 500,000 to 600,000 Chungking 
troops. All supplies shipped from Russia have been sent to the 
National Government. 
MILITARY EFFICIENCY 
Despite the blockade, the Communist and guerrilla armies, 
in the opmion of some observers, have in recent years conducted 
.a more vigorous campaign against the Japanese than have the 
Chungking armies. While we have no way of measuring the 
effectiveness of the behind-the-lines guerrilla activities, reports 
by such competent observers as Lieut. Col. Evans F. Carlson of 
the United States Marine Corps indicate a rather remarkable 
military efficiency. Figures on enemy casualties also seem to show 
.a relative gain in the efficjency of the troops affiliated with the 
Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army as compared 
with the Kuomintang armies-although some observers cast 
doubt on these figures. 
Since all the advantages of numbers, equipment and outside 
supplies have been on the side of the Kuomintang armies, the rjse 
m the relative effectiveness of the Communist armies is appar-
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ently based on a greater will to resist among the Communist 
troops and a more thorough mobilization of the human and 
material resources in the guerrilla districts. Spokesmen for t;he 
Communists attribute their relatively greater effectiveness to their 
agrarian reforms and to the introduction of democratic self-
government. Through these changes new energies have been 
released and new hopes aroused. The war has become a people's 
war in the fullest sense. 
KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST RELATIONS 
This background should be kept in mind in reviewing the re-
lationship between the KuominLang and the Communists s.ince 
the outbreak of war. The relationship might best be described as 
an armed truce. Following the agreement entered into in 1937, 
the Communists have been tolerated on a semi-legal basis. They 
have been perm.itted to maintain representatives in Chungking, 
and they have been allowed to publish a newspaper in the capital. 
They are even represented in the People's Political Council. But 
outside of Chungking, except in the "special" districts controlled 
by the Eighth Route Army, Communist Party activities are still 
prohibited. Nor, as we have seen, have they received for several 
years any financial assistance or supplies from the National Gov-
ernment at Chungking. 
Chungking's suspicion of the Communists can be explained on 
many grounds. In part, no doubt, it derives from the influence 
of reactionary elements in the Kuomintang who are opposed to 
all liberal or progressive forces and who find it convenient to 
brand all such movements as Communist whether or not there is 
any basis for this charge. It is known that such elements have the 
ear of the Generalissimo and that they try to control the informa-
tion which reaches him. In part, Chungking's attitude toward the 
Communists stems from the principle, accepted since 1928, that 
during the present phase of "political tutelage"-at least until 
all vestiges of foreign control have been removed-China needs a 
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strong one-party government. Hence the Kuomintang alone must 
bear the responsibility for national policy. Finally, suspicion of 
the Communists is nourished by the fear that, after the war if 
not before, they will use any opportunities that are given them to 
extend their own influence at the expense of the Kuomintang and 
even attempt to overthrow the National Government. Although 
the Communists stoutly deny any revolutionary intentions, the 
suspicion remains. 
Since 1941 the tension between the Kuomintang and the Com-
munists has been almost at the breaking point. Rumors have 
been rife regarding the possibility of open civil war, but reliable 
information on the situatjon has been extraordinarily difficult to 
obtain. News sent out of China is, of course, subject to rigid 
government censorship. Up to the end of 1943, the Chinese gov-
ernment ~ad refused to permit either American or Brit.ish mil-
itary observers to go into the Northwest. All news from this 
region is rigidly censored. 
THREAT OF CIVIL WAR 
In September 1943, for example, Chungking reported that 
10,000 Communist troops had "attacked and destroyed" a large 
force of Kuomintang troops. Some time later, an Eighth Route 
Army spokesman denied the charge completely. Americans return-
ing from China report that incidents are constantly occurring be-
tween the rival forces, any one of which could easily lead to a full-
fledged civil war .if either party so desired. There is also constant 
danger lest some ambitious general attack the Communists in 
hope of capitalizing on the prevailing anti-Communist sentiment 
jn Chungking to strengthen his political or military posicion. 
It is scarcely necessary to point out the importance of prevent-
ing civil war in China at this time. Such a conflict would not 
only undermine China's miljtary effectiveness and thus play into 
the hands of Japan, but it might cause serious difficulties within 
the United Nations. At present the United States, Britain and 
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Russia are agreed on the necessity of preventing civil conflict. 
Should such a conflict arise, they might become divided as to 
the best way of dealing with the situation. 
In what many observers regarded as an effort to quiet Ameri-
can, British and Russian fears of a civjl war in China, Chiang 
Kai-shek issued an official statement on September 13, 1943, de-
claring that the "Chinese Government does not have any particular 
demand to make on the Chinese Communist Party" and was 
prepared "to be tolerant." He added that the "Communist prob-
lem is purely a political problem and should be solved by political 
means." 
KUOMINTANG DEMANDS 
But then he went on to accuse the Communists of "assaulting 
national government troops" and "forcefully occupying our na-
tional territory." He repeated demands previously made by the 
Kuomintang for the disbandment of the Eighth Route Army and 
the dissolution of all Communist governmental organizations, in-
cluding the local governments, while o!Iering no concessions to 
the Communist demand for guarantees for the rights of a minor-
ity party. He demanded that the Communist Party "redeem its 
pledge" made in )ts declaration of 1937: (1) to struggle for the 
realization of the Three People's Principles; (2) to abandon the 
policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang regime by force; (3) to 
dissolve its present government organization an~ by carrying 
jnto practice the principles of democracy thus help to bring about 
the political unity of the whole nation; (4) to disband the Red 
Army by incorporating it into the National Army under the 
direct command of the Military Council of the National Gov-
ernment. 
These are, of course, demands which the Communists accepted 
in principle at the outset of the war. They have carried out some 
of them and have stated their willingness to carry out all of 
them provided the National Government takes practical steps to 
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safeguard their democratic rights as a minority party. Specifically, 
the Communists ask some assurance against a return of the land-
lords and moneylenders in the areas where land reforms have 
been put into effect. They ask that immediate steps be taken 
to assure local self-government and the creation of a national 
People's Congress in which Communists and other minority 
groups might obtain fair representation. Similarly, before the 
Red Army is placed under Chungking control, they want assur-
ance that the men wjll be paid in full, be adequately armed and 
supplied, and that all forces will be used effectively in the war 
against Japan. 
At the Cairo conference it is reported that "the conferees took 
cognizance of the fact that internal differences between the troops 
of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Commun.ist armies must be 
overcome before China could be used as a primary base for an 
attack against Japan ." We still do not know what effect this dis-
cussion had on the tense relations between the two parties. Feel-
ing still runs strong on both sides, but neither side seems disposed 
to violate the truce that has prevailed, with the exception of minor 
outbreaks, since 1937. There is reason to hope that a compromise 
may be worked out that will enable both groups to throw their 
entire resources into the struggle against Japan. 
FEDERATION OF CHINESE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES 
It is not quite fair to say that the Communists are the only 
opposition party in China. Several minor parties exist which have 
generally democratic objectives. Most of these are banded together 
in an organization called the Federation of Chinese Democratic 
Parties. This organization, headed by Chang Lan, a former gov-
ernor of Szechwan, was formed on March 25, 1941. Some time 
later it issued a Ten Point Program which is an "'xcellent state-
ment of democratic principles as applied to war-time China. The 
five leading groups participating in this declaration are: 
1. The National Socialist Party. Despite its name, th,is party 
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is not "Nazi"; nor is it socialist. Formerly more conservative 
than the Kuomintang, it has become moderately progressive. It 
has, however, little following outside of academic circles. 
2. The Young China Party. This is an essentially conservative 
party with a moderately democratic outlook. 
3. Tl2e Third Party is the lineal descendant and inheritor of 
the original revolutionary principles of the Kuomintang. It broke 
off from the latter in 1927 when the Kuomintang swung sharply 
to the right. It has the greatest political potentialities of any of 
the five groups. 
4. The Rural Reconstructionists are not in any sense a political 
party, but consist of several groups who are interested in the eco-
nomic and educational reconstruction of the Chinese village. 
Among the leaders is James Y. C. Yen, founder of the Mass Edu-
cation Movement. 
5. Somewhat similar is the Vocational Education Group, 
which is comprised of men connected with the vocational schools 
in the province of Kiangsu. 
None of these five groups possesses any real political influence, 
and none has any popular following to speak of. As a federation 
they could wield considerable influence if a representative form 
of government were established, but at present their activities 
are sharply curbed. They are, however, worth greater attention 
than they have yet received in this country. 
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STRENGTHENING CHINA'S WAR EFFORT 
It is generally believed that the military strategy worked out 
at the Cairo conference involves a major drive against Japan from 
the Asiatic mainland . In that case the Un.ited Nations have m uch 
at stake in strengthening China for that attack. Many Americans 
have supposed that this could be done merely by reconquering 
Burma and reopening the Burma Road. Actually, it is doubtful 
whether this would be enough, even from the standpoint of sup-
plies alone. But when the complex of economic, military and 
political factors affecting China's war effort is considered, it is 
quite plain that a much more comprehensive program is required. 
SUPPLY ROUTES 
The supply problem in itself is bound to be difficult. At best the 
Burma Road, even if reopened and supplemented by the new 
Ledo Road, can carry only a small volume of supplies into China. 
Hence most military men believe that an offensive against Japan 
from China can be supported only if, in addition to reopening the 
Bmma Road, some of the ports, such as Canton and Hongkong, 
can be reconquered. The opening of a port through which foreign 
supplies could be shipped into China would not only strengthen 
her military position but would help to check inflation. 
China has already received more American dnd British credits 
than she can easily utilize under present conditions, and it is 
qu~tionable whether further financial assistance would be help-
ful at this time. In any case, the experience with American 
financial ajd in the past suggests that additional assistance should 
be provided only upon evidence of concrete steps to stimulate 
war industries and curb speculation. Much can still be done 
to develop the production of war materials within China, but only 
if those elements in the Chungking government favorable to re-
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form can overcome the political and social obstacles which have 
hitherto hamstrung such efforts. 
ARMY REORGANIZATION 
If an increased Row of modern equipment is to be used effec-
tively, the Chinese Army needs to be reorganized along modern 
lines. This js not as impossible a task as has been suggested in 
some circles, but it can be carried out only by Chinese com-
manders who are convinced of its necessity. The lack of coopera-
tion which American instructors and technicians have encoun-
tered from some Chinese officers indicates that a reorganization 
of the Chinese high command must precede any large-scale 
efforts at technical reorganiza~ion. More emphasis also needs to 
be placed upon training the Kuomintang armies in effective 
guerrilla methods in cooperation with people of the areas in 
Central and South China where guerrjlla warfare has never been 
developed. The dispatch of American observers and technical 
assistance to the guerrilla areas of the orthwest may also be 
regarded as an essential step in the accentuation of the behind-
the-lines warfare which has proved such a nightmare to the Japa-
nese. The guerrilla stronghold ::onta.ins potential air bases which, 
if properly developed, could bring Japan's home islands within 
effective bombing range. 
Our analysis makes it clear that revitalization of China's war 
effort calls for political readjustments. Because China is sensitive 
-and with reason-regarding foreign interference in her internal 
affairs, this problem may be hard to solve. Experience with a 
century of Western imperialism has made the Chinese suspicious 
of foreign influence of any kind. The Chinese, regardless of 
party, are determined that Chinese natjonal policy shall never 
again be dictated by foreigners. Because of the depth of this 
feeling, the American, British and Soviet governments have been 
hesitant to offer advice to the Chinese government on matters of 
domestic policy. They have, however, limited their economic and 
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military assistance because o£ fear that any supplies they send 
might be used in civil strife rather than against the Japanese. 
"ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE" 
Yet as partners in a common war against a dangerous and re-
sourceful foe, all of the Un.ited Nations are necessarily concerned 
in bringing maximum pressure against the enemy. The differ-
ence between an early, decisive victory against Japan and a long, 
indecisive campaign may be measured in hundreds of thousands 
of American and British lives and perhaps in millions o£ Chinese 
lives. Purely destructive criticism does not help China; rather 
it plays into the hands of our enemies, who seek to divide the 
United Nations from one another. Friendly and constructive 
criticism, directed toward strengthening the common war effort 
and toward strengthening China to play the great post-war role 
which history has assigned to her, should not, however, be re -
garded as presumptuous. Basically, it should be regarded in the 
same light as Chiang Kai-shek's own commendable efiorts to 
br.ing about a settlement of the conflict between the British gov-
ernment and the Indian National Congress. This viewpoint has 
been expressed very ably by a distinguished Chinese writer, Lin 
Yu-tang, in justifying his own frank and vigorous criticisms of 
American and British policies. In a recent book, Between Tears 
and Laugher, Dr. Lin wrote: 
Among allies at war, every citizen has the right and the duty 
to criticize the conduct of allied governments in matters that 
concern the common war .... I should be highly appreciative 
if an Allied citizen would point out where the conduct of the 
Chinese Government is slowing down the war with Japan, 
and, by such frank criticism, lessen the cost of Chinese lives 
before the war with Japan is won. 
China's allies cannot, of course, tell her exactly what kind of 
political reorganization is necessary to revitalize her war effort. 
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Poli(ical adjustments necessarily represent difficult compromises 
which must come from within. I t may be assumed that Chiang 
Kai-shek would like to see an accentuation of China's war effort 
but that he does not have the political strength to effect the 
necessary governmental changes single-handed. The Cairo con-
ference, offering China more than she could possibly achieve by 
her own arms, undoubtedly added greatly to Chiang's prestige 
and presumably tended to lessen the influence of the anti-United 
Nations clique in Chungking. Much still depends, however, on 
the practical steps taken to implement the Cairo declaratjon. 
Chiang's ability to take his country more actively into the war 
will rest on the concrete arrangements which are made to provide 
the Chinese armies w.i1 h modern equipment and adequate sup-
plies. As a realistic political leader, Chiang knows that if he is 
to alienate the reactionary influences withjn the Kuomintang 
that are sabotaging the war, he must be assured of the economic 
and military supplies necessary to support his new position. 
Similarly, .if he is to permit military assistance to flow to the Eighth 
Route Army on the same basis as to other armies, he must be 
able to show that it is part of a larger United Nations strategical 
plan to hasten the final downfall of Japan. 
STRONG WAR GOVERNMENT NEEDED 
There 1s every reason to believe that the creation of a strong 
war government headed by Chiang Kaj-shek and supported by 
positive assistance from the United Nations would be extremely 
well received within China. Its long-run strength would depend, 
however, upon its willingness to set up a genuinely democratic 
machinery that would permit the popular forces which have 
always supported the war to make themselves felt. A promise has 
already been made that such machinery would be created after 
the war. But progressive Chinese have long urged that at least 
preliminary steps for the establishment of a constitutional gov-
c>rnment be taken now so that the government might reap the 
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political advantages of such a move during the war. Possibly 
measures looking in this direction are already under way. China's 
exper.ience in the war thus far has been that resistance to Japan 
and the trend toward democracy are twin fotces that are so closely 
interrelated that it is impossible to separate them. 
A VIF. W OF Til E llURMA ROAD. 
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CHINA .PLANS FOR THE FUTURE 
It would be very wrong to conclude from what has been said 
above that China is sliding back into her old backward state 
and that hope of her developing as a strong, democratic modern 
nation must be abandoned. At present, China is passing through 
a very difficult phase in her history-one in which she greatly 
needs the sympathy, understanding and forbearance of her friends 
abroad. When Japan is defeated and China is able to turn her 
attention to the problems of reconstruction, we may expect that 
the progress interrupted in 1937 will be resumed. Even today a 
lively interest in plans for post-war reconstruction is apparent 
in Chungking. Desp,ite the confusion and discouragements of 
war-time conditions, such plans are already being formulated in 
very concrete terms. 
These plans have had as their general objective a rapid indus-
trialization of China with special emphasis on heavy industries, 
power plants, railway and highway construction, aviation and 
waterway development. Less emphasis is placed on light indus-
try. Because of the shortage of private industrial capital, it is 
assumed that the large-scale projects will be financed and con-
trolled either by government corporations or by a combination of 
government and private capital. Foreign aid will be welcomed, 
provided there are no strings attached. Steps were taken jn the 
fall of 1943 to liberalize the rules governing foreign investment 
during the reconstruction period. 
The need for railway construction is especially great. Before 
the war the whole of China, including Manchuria, had only 
about 26 miles of railway for each million of population. In con-
trast, India had 262 miles per million, Japan 349, the Soviet Union 
511, Great Britain 754, and the United States 3,200 miles. Further-
more, China has very few modern highways. 
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INDUSTRIAL POTENTIALS 
Three important areas in China are suitable for the develop-
ment of heavy industries. The most important of these is south-
ern Manchuria, wh.ich the Japanese have been attempting to 
develop on a huge scale since they took over this region in 1931. 
Next is the Central China area, with Hankow as its center, which 
was the only significant iron and steel producing region before 
the war. Finally, there is the area around the present capital at 
Chungking, which has been partly developed during the war. 
Two other areas in China's southwest and northwest await 
industrial development. The district around Kunming, capital 
of Yunnan in the southwest, has supplies of tin and copper easily 
available and has substantial coal resources. Although it lacks 
iron ore, such ore could be brought in rather cheaply from the 
province of Sikang by building a fairly short railway line. The 
northwest-around the city of Siam-has both coal and petroleum, 
and it has the further advantage of being near the chief cotton-
producing areas. Altogether, the mineral resources of the ten 
provinces in the southwest and northwest are large enough to 
support industrial growth for many years to come. They include 
more than a third of China's 246 billion metric tons of coal re-
serves, and fairly abundant supplies of such metals as tin, gold, 
copper, mercury, tungs"ten, antimony, lead, zinc and manganese. 
GOALS 
Something of the extent of the planned development in the ten-
year pedod following the war may be seen in the program out-
lined by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The goals set by this 































Though ambitious, this is not an impossible program. Although 
China has been slow in carrying out the reconstruction program 
outlined by Sun Yat-sen some twenty years ago, the progress 
made in the few years preceding the Japanese invasion-and in 
limited areas since the war-proves that China has the technical 
competence to carry such a program to completion. The economic 
and political obstacles that have hampered industrializatjon dur-
ing the war years should be eliminated by the reappearance of 
foreign trade and the re-emergence of the more progressive busi-
ness leaders of the port cities. Some observers predict, however, 
that the emphas,is on government enterprises will not be main-
tained rigidly, and that some of China's wealthy families will 
profit by their government connections to the extent of large-
scale participation in the more profitable reconstruction projects. 
They fear that unless democratic safeguards are created, Chinese 
industrialization will follow the pattern of Japanese industrializa-
tion. Japan's experience shows that the development of modern 
industry does not necessarily raise the livjng standards of the 
majority of the population but may merely serve to accentuate 
the gap between the rich and the poor. J 
Moreover, it must be recognized that China can support a 
modern industry only if her hundred million peasant farmers 
become more productive. And there is still great confusion re-
garding the fundamentals of her post-war agricultural policy. In 
this country we think of agricultural productivity in terms of 
tractors, combines, commercial fertilizers and rotation of crops. 
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None of these, save rotat.ion of crops, would mean much to China 
under present conditions. China's farms are much too small to 
apply the methods of large-scale cultivation used in this country. 
Given the conditions under which he must work, the average 
Chinese farmer is reasonably efficient, but he is desperately handi-
capped-as we have seen- by an archaic system of land tenure, 
heavy indebtedness at usurious interest rates, extremely high 
tax rates, and lack of capital for even his simple operations. 
While the Communists have put a program of land reform 
into effect, opinion in Kuomintang China is seriously divided 
on basic policy. Some groups would have the government extend 
credit to the tenants so that they might buy land from the land-
lords. Others favor the nationalization of all land, while other 
groups would limit the amount of land any individual may own. 
But powerful elements with.in the Kuomintang are opposed to 
any fundamental change in landlord-tenant relations, suggesting 
that nothing can be done beyond an attempt to enforce the rent 
law restricting }and rent to 37.5 per cent of the proceeds of the 
farm. 
NEED FOR IRRIGATION 
All groups are agreed, however, on the necessity for increasing 
the area of cultivated land. Since much of China is far too dry 
for intensive farming, an extension of irrigation facilities is des-
perately needed. There is room in China for a dozen TV A's. 
Such projects would employ millions of men in the critical post-
war period and when finished would provide a solid basis for 
improv.ing the living standards of tens of millions of Chinese 
families. 
China's post-war industrial and agricultural policies will, in 
the last analysis, be determined by political forces. Her political 
prospects hinge on two developments. The first is the chance of 
arriving at a permanent basis of settlement of the long-standing 
conflict between Kuomintang and the Communists. Following 
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the Cairo conference there seemed to be an excellent chance of a 
temporary br.idging of the conflict for the duration of the war. 
If the war against Japan is intensified, some of the misunderstand-
ing between the two groups may be removed. But a permanent 
basis of settlement seems to rest on two things: (1) the Kuomin-
tang's willingness to sponsor a fundamental program of land 
reform; and (2) the extent to which minority parties will be 
able to work within the framework of the new Constitution . The 
Communist Party has already disclaimed any intention of push-
ing a socialist or Communist program in the post-war period 
and has indicated its immediate interest lies in a program of 
moderate democratic reforms. 
DEMOCRACY'S FUTURE 
The second development on which the future of post-war China 
hinges is the development of a genuine democracy under the new 
Constitution. The Draft Constitution has many good features, 
although, as pointed out above, many Chinese feel that it should 
be revised in order to make the government more responsive to 
popular control. No constitution can guarantee democracy, how-
ever, and many cr.itics are fearful lest the reactionary groups that 
now dominate the Kuomintang may continue to frustrate any 
genuine expression of the popular will under the Constitution. 
Against this fear stands the indisputable fact that the war has 
given the Chinese people a new sense of thejr powers as well 
as of their essential democratic rights. Once a people has been 
aroused as the Chinese have been in these past few years, it is 
impossible to believe that they will not find a way to shape the 
policies of their government. 
The impact of war has released great stores of unsuspected 
energy which have enabled China to surprise the world by the 
strength and tenacity of her resistance to Japanese aggression. 
After the war this energy will be devoted to the unfinished task 
of building a new China, firmly rooted in the great traditions 
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of Chinese civilization but adapted to the necessities of modern 
life. With her vast population and undeveloped resources C ·ina 
may be expected to take her place among the great powers of \e 
world. We need not fear this; on the contrary, we may be sure 
that China's inAuence will be exerted on the side of preserving 
peace in the Pacific. In fact, China's major interests- peace and 
peaceful trade-coinc,ide precisely with those of the United States. 
A firm understanding and close cooperation between China and 
the United States is essential to the preservation of peace and 
prosperity in the Pacific and throughout the world. 
In the post-war period China will need American help-
American capital, technical aid and diplomatic backing. China 
deserves our continued support, which, indeed, js in our own in-
terest as well as hers. That she will welcome our aid is clear. 
But China, proud in her new emancipation, will be quick to re-
sent anything that smacks of the old unequal regime of recent and 
bitter memory. The new China will have its ups and downs. Its 
record will not be free from mistakes- any more than our own 
has been. Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by 
trying to understand the magnitude of the task which she faces 
in transforming an ancient medieval society into a modern demo-
cratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties as well as her 
achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must re-
member that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in 
years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China 
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